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Abstract—The extended mind hypothesis has stimulated 
much interest in cognitive science. However, its core claim, i.e. 
that the process of cognition can extend beyond the brain via the 
body and into the environment, has been heavily criticized. A 
prominent critique of this claim holds that when some part of the 
world is coupled to a cognitive system this does not necessarily 
entail that the part is also constitutive of that cognitive system. 
This critique is known as the “coupling-constitution fallacy”. In 
this paper we respond to this reductionist challenge by using an 
evolutionary robotics approach to create a minimal model of two 
acoustically coupled agents. We demonstrate how the interaction 
process as a whole has properties that cannot be reduced to the 
contributions of the isolated agents. We also show that the neural 
dynamics of the coupled agents has formal properties that are 
inherently impossible for those neural networks in isolation. By 
keeping the complexity of the model to an absolute minimum, we 
are able to illustrate how the coupling-constitution fallacy is in 
fact based on an inadequate understanding of the constitutive 
role of nonlinear interactions in dynamical systems theory. 
Keywords—philosophy of mind; cognitive science; dynamical 
approach; extended mind hypothesis; evolutionary robotics.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH), first formulated by 
Clark and Chalmers in 1998 [1], is continuing to receive much 
positive attention in the philosophy of cognitive science [2-5] 
and fits an embodied, enactive, and dynamical approach [6-9]. 
However, its core claim, that cognition can extend beyond the 
brain and into the environment, also continues to be criticized, 
especially for supposedly committing a “coupling-constitution 
fallacy” [10-12]. This criticism is based on the claim that when 
a part is coupled to a cognitive system this does not necessarily 
entail that this part is also constitutive of that cognitive system. 
With the growing incorporation of complexity theory into most 
areas of natural science [13], this kind of reductionist critique 
seems limited and outdated. And yet, even though the concept 
of systemic coupling is also foundational to dynamical systems 
theory, it is surprising that so far there have only been few 
attempts to evaluate this point of contention from such a more 
formal perspective. Nevertheless, reformulating the EMH in 
systemic terms is beginning to be considered as a promising 
response [8, 14, 15]. For ease of reference, we will refer to 
such a systemic perspective on behavior and cognition [16-18] 
as the Dynamical Systems Hypothesis (DSH). 
As yet another alternative to orthodox functionalism in the 
philosophy of cognitive science, the DSH is losely affiliated 
with the EMH [19]. Nevertheless, it is still not clear just how 
compatible these alternative approaches are [20]. Specifically, 
while the EMH has largely developed out of orthodox 
functionalism, and therefore still retains many of its guiding 
assumptions, the DSH was originally derived from a different 
branch of cybernetics, one which is more compatible with 
ecological psychology and systems biology [21]. The essential 
difference between these two traditional frameworks becomes 
evident when we consider their divergent opinions on what 
constitutes a paradigmatic cognitive system, i.e. a computer 
running algorithms on data, versus an organism engaged in an 
ongoing interaction within its environment.  
These two competing intuitions have resulted in different 
theories about the nature of cognitive extension. The EMH in 
effect accepts that cognition is something that primarily occurs 
in the brain, and secondarily asks about possible exceptions to 
this internalism, such as during tool-use. For the DSH, on the 
other hand, the mind was never located only inside the head in 
the first place [14]. Instead, cognition is primarily conceived of 
as a form of viable conduct by an agent in an environment [22]. 
Cognition is therefore treated as a relational process spanning 
the nonlinear interactions of brain, body, and environment [23], 
including other agents [24]. And although it helps to analyze 
the different contributions made by the individual components, 
the properties of the overall process cannot simply be reduced 
to one of the isolated components alone. In other words, the 
DSH takes the notion of an extended mind as its starting point, 
rather than as a curious exception.1 A similar conclusion is also 
starting to be advocated in response to the challenge of the 
coupling-constitution fallacy for the EMH [26-28]. 
How does the DSH avoid the coupling-constitution fallacy? 
First of all, according to the DSH the very question of a spatial 
location of cognition is misguided. For example, consider the 
fact that the current paragraph is placed on the right-hand side 
in relation to the first column of text. But where is this relation 
of “being on the right-hand side” itself located? It is not on the 
right-hand side; since it is a relational property that compares 
                                                           
1 The DSH, like the enactive approach to cognitive science, is instead faced 
with the challenge to explain abstract forms of cognition, especially if they do 
not seem to involve interaction with the environment in any essential manner. 
We will not try to address this challenge here, but see e.g. [25]. 
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two phenomena, it itself is not located anywhere. The same 
reasoning applies to cognition if we conceive of it as a kind of 
adaptive relationship between an agent and its environment. If 
cognition is a relational phenomenon, it logically cannot be 
located inside the brain (or anywhere). The same can be said 
about our conscious experience, which involves a perspectival 
relationship between body and environment. However, given 
that this DSH response depends on accepting precisely that 
which is at stake in the first place, i.e. an extended view of the 
mind, it is not much help against the charge of a coupling-
constitution fallacy. Even if the critics accepted that cognition 
is a relational phenomenon, they would still want to hold on to 
the claim that the physical mechanisms underlying cognition 
(or conscious experience [29]) are limited to the activity of the 
nervous system. Thus, a better response to the critics would be 
to demonstrate that, even if we accept their internalist starting 
point, a proper understanding of neuronal activity will force us 
to accept an extended view of the mind nonetheless.  
In the following we provide a proof of concept in the form 
of a minimal model of an embodied agent. We show that the 
artificial nervous system (ANS) of this agent is a qualitatively 
different kind of dynamical system when it is embodied and 
situated in an environment, compared to when it is considered 
in isolation. Moreover, in order to counter the potential charge 
that the agent’s body and/or the environment are only serving 
as external input or secondary scaffolding for what essentially 
remains an isolated ANS, we demonstrate that the embodied 
and situated ANS has a formal property that is impossible to be 
generated by any isolated part of the model. If we take the class 
identity of a dynamical system to be defined by its organization 
[30], then this change of identity of the ANS from one type of 
system to another, is only explainable as an emergent outcome 
of nonlinear coupling between ANS, body and the environment 
subsystems. From the perspective of dynamical systems theory, 
this formal mathematical result is not surprising:  
“[…] when the agent and the environment are nonlinearly 
coupled, they, together, constitute a nondecomposable system, 
and when that is the case, the coupling-constitution fallacy is 
not a fallacy. In other words, the coupling-constitution fallacy 
is only a fallacy when the coupling is linear.” ([8], pp. 31-32)  
In general, nonlinear coupling tends to transform the 
identity of the interacting components, and to assume 
otherwise would be instead to commit an error that we might 
call the “coupling-reduction fallacy”. This reductionist fallacy 
was characteristic of the classical scientific worldview from 
Galileo and Newton onwards, but such linear thinking is 
rapidly being replaced by a worldview based on complexity 
[13]. In conclusion, by arguing that the organism-environment 
interactions are best described in terms of nonlinear coupling 
between dynamical systems, we reject the couping-constitution 
fallacy as unfounded.  
II. THEORY 
We took our initial inspiration from Walter’s [31] famous robot 
“tortoises”, which were some of the first mobile robots. In spite 
of only having a simple reactive control architecture, and only 
touch and light sensors, the robots were capable of exhibiting a 
variety of lifelike behaviors, especially in interaction with each 
other, that lent themselves to interpretation in cognitive terms. 
Similar to later examples of situated robotics and models of 
minimal embodied cognition (e.g. Brooks [32] and Beer [33]; 
for a review, see [34]), such artificial agents are powerful tools 
for the EMH and DSH. The analysis of what is happening in 
terms of the whole systems is tractable, while still strongly 
making the point that cognition is primarily a relational and 
distributed process [35]. We follow this tradition in keeping 
our model of embodied agents as minimal as possible to better 
illustrate the transformative effects emerging from nonlinear 
coupling between dynamical systems. 
 In particular, our aim is to build a model of an embodied 
agent, whose artificial nervous system (ANS) has mathematical 
properties that are in principle impossible for it to have in 
isolation. The motivation for this criterion is the need to go 
beyond a demonstration of how an agent’s situatedness within 
a sensorimotor loop modulates the internal activity of the ANS, 
but can transform the ANS into a qualitatively different kind of 
system altogether. Chaos is a suitable property for measuring 
such a transformation. It has been mathematically proven that 
it is impossible for a phase plane to exhibit chaotic dynamics 
(the Poincaré-Bendixon theorem); a smooth dynamical system 
must be at least three-dimensional, i.e. consisting of at least 
three partial differential equations, to be capable of exhibiting 
chaotic activity [36]. In other words, if an ANS with less than 
3D is nonlinearly coupled with other non-chaotic systems, and 
its internal neural activity spontaneously becomes chaotic, then 
an explanation of this property as resulting from an extended 
process of interaction cannot be accused of committing the 
coupling-constitution fallacy. This minimal proof of concept is 
intended as an illustration. It does not entail that all neuronal 
activity is constituted by nonlinear coupling with body and 
environment in practice (some activity is mainly endogenous to 
the brain), but it clearly shows that there is nothing mysterious 
about cognitive extension in principle. 
 Related work has been done by Beer [37], who showed that 
an isolated 2D dynamical system of a particular kind can be 
transformed into a chaotic one by externally modulating it with 
a sinusoidal input having appropriate amplitude and frequency. 
But in this case it could still be argued that the input signal is 
only a form of external scaffolding that is independent of the 
system itself. It cannot be denied that this signal has a causal 
impact on the activity of the system, but this is not sufficient to 
count it as a constitutive part of that system. An overlenient 
criterion of inclusion raises the worry that anything that has an 
effect on the system must be included as being part of that 
system. But this is not so. Mathematically, the distinction can 
be expressed as the difference between an external parameter 
and an internal variable of the system. Nevertheless, a related 
worry of “cognitive bloat” has been charged against the EMH, 
so it is important to find a principled manner of avoiding this 
problem of over-inclusiveness.  
 We follow the enactive approach to cognitive science [7] in 
defining the systemic identity of a network of processes in 
terms of operational closure. More precisely, in order for a 
process to be included as a part of the system it must enable, 
and be enabled by, at least one other process of that system 
[38]. A paradigmatic example is the self-producing network of 
metabolic processes that physically bring forth the organism, 
i.e. autopoiesis [39]. Some proponents of the EMH have raised 
the worry that this concept of operational closure is tied to an 
internalist theory of mind [40], but this worry confuses the 
organism’s spatial boundaries with its organizational limits 
[41]. There is nothing preventing the operational closure of the 
living from extending into the environment, as long as the 
condition of co-dependence applies. Regarding Beer’s example 
of a 2D system with chaotic activity, we know that this activity 
depends upon properties of the input signal, but this signal does 
not in turn depend upon the activity of the system. Thus, the 
signal does not form a part of that system. In order to count as 
a genuine example of extension, the input signal itself must be 
dependent on the activity of the system as well.  
 We therefore set out to create a minimal agent-based model 
where this operational closure criterion of systemic inclusion is 
satisfied. Previous work in evolutionary robotics has shown 
that the interaction process between two embodied agents can 
transform the state space of their ANS, often implemented as a 
Continuous-Time Recurrent Neural Network (CTRNN), such 
that new behaviors emerge [42-44]. This finding fits well with 
evidence from experimental psychology and neuroscience, 
which also supports the possibility of a socially extended mind 
[45-48]. Accordingly, we hypothesized that an agent’s ANS 
state space may become extended across both CTRNNs during 
some forms of interaction [24], such that even agents with a 2D 
or lower dimensional ANS can exhibit chaotic neural activity. 
The aim was for the agents to interact with each other so as to 
mutually complement their internal dynamics to overcome the 
restrictions that in principle apply to isolated 2D systems. 
However, as will be described in the next section, it turned out 
that our criterion can already be satisfied by a much simpler 
model of interacting agents. 
III. METHODS 
In this section we briefly describe the methods used in order to 
create a minimal model of a chaotic embodied agent. We began 
work on our model as a replication of Di Paolo’s [49] model of 
two acoustically coupled embodied agents, which was created 
using an evolutionary robotics method [50-52]. Details of this 
model and of our modifications are provided to ensure 
replicability of the approach. Some readers may wish to skip 
the technical details of how our model was created and proceed 
to the results presented in the next section. 
A. The body and environment 
The body of each agent is modeled as a circular object of 
radius R = 4 with two motors placed on parallel sides and two 
sound sensors symmetrically positioned at 45 degrees to the 
motors. This placement of the sensors introduces a back/front 
asymmetry. In contrast to Di Paolo’s model, the agent makes a 
constant sound, whose source is located at the center of their 
body. Because the agent’s own sound is constant, it is ignored 
by its sensors. The motors can rotate backwards and forwards, 
thereby moving the agent in a 2D unstructured and unlimited 
arena. For purposes of simplicity, the body is treated as a 
small rigid object with a very small mass, so that the motor 
output is the tangential velocity at the point of the body where 
the motor is located. Translational movement of the whole 
agent is calculated as the velocity of its center of mass (i.e. the 
vector average of the two motor velocities), and the rotational 
movement is calculated as the angular speed (i.e. the 
difference of the tangential velocities divided by the diameter 
of the body). The model does not include inertial resistance to 
either form of movement. 
The agents are placed in an unlimited 2D environment that 
is empty apart from the agents’ bodies. The agents move freely 
in this arena except when they collide. Collisions are modeled 
as point elastic, i.e. without energy loss and without effect on 
the angular velocity of the bodies. During a collision, an agent 
moves in a direction which is not the one specified by its two 
motors, but which corresponds to a displacement that 
conserves the momentum of the whole system. The bodies of 
both agents are taken as identical so that the result of an elastic 
collision is the instantaneous ‘swapping’ of the velocity vectors 
at the center of mass. However, due to the lack of inertia, the 
agents recover control of their movement immediately after the 
collision. The body circumference is taken as frictionless so 
that the angular velocities do not change during collisions. No 
touch sensors are used. 
Sound is modeled as an instantaneous additive field of a 
single frequency with time-varying intensity, which decreases 
with the square of the distance from the source. For simplicity, 
the model excludes the effects of time-delays and differences 
between frequencies of sound production (e.g. Doppler effect, 
differential filtering). To help the agents in performing spatial 
discrimination with their sound sensors, these are placed at a 
distance from each other on the outside of the body. The two 
sensors will thereby be influenced by different intensities from 
the same external source, and this relative activity provides a 
basis for spatial discrimination. In addition, sound is treated as 
high-frequency such that the sound’s penetration of the body is 
a source of attenuation. The amount of attenuation is related to 
the angular position and movement of the listening agent (the 
agent’s own constant sound is ignored). The body’s ‘sound-
shadowing’ mechanism is implemented as a linear attenuation 
without refraction proportional to the distance traveled by the 
signal within the body, Dsh. This distance is given by 
ܦ௦௛ ൌ ܦ௦௘௡ሺ1 െ ܣሻ, 0 ൑ ܣ ൏ 1 
ܣ ൌ ܦ
ଶ െ ܴ଴ଶ
ܦ௦௘௡ଶ  
where Dsen is the distance between the sound source and the 
sensor, and D is the distance between the source and the center 
of the body. If A ≥ 1, there is a direct line between source and 
sensor, and so Dsh = 0. For A = 1 the agent’s sensor, the center 
of its body and the external source form a right triangle. The 
maximum value of Dsh is given when the sensor is directly 
adjacent to the external source (Dsh = 2R). The intensity of the 
attenuated sound signal is calculated by first determining the 
intensity of the signal at the position of the sensor in the usual 
way, namely by applying the inverse square law without any 
attenuation, and then multiplying by an attenuating factor that 
goes linearly from 1 when Dsh = 0 to 0.1 when Dsh = 2R. The 
process is done once for each sensor at each time step.  
B. The brain 
We chose to follow the standard procedure in evolutionary 
robotic and therefore modeled the agent’s ANS with a CTRNN 
[23]. A CTRNN has the following state equation: 
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where s is the state of each artificial neuron in analogy with 
the cell potential, τ is its time decay constant, wji is the strength 
of the connection from the jth to the ith neuron, g is a gain, θ is a 
bias term, σ(x) is firing rate modeled by the standard logistic 
activation function, and I represents an external stimulus from 
a sensor modeled as a simple input current. The initial neural 
architecture consisted of three fully interconnected neurons (N 
= 3). We chose to exlude the gain parameter by fixing it at a 
constant 1. We began the artificial selection process with such 
a 3D system rather than a 2D system because this redundancy 
can facilitate the evolution of interesting behavior. The extra 
neuron served the role of interneuron and was only connected 
with other neurons. The other two neurons receive inputs from 
both of the agent’s sensors, where each input connection is 
multiplied by an input gain parameter. These same two neurons 
are also connected to the motors in a one-to-one manner. More 
precisely, neuron i’s output σi is transformed into the motor 
velocity vi as follows: 
ݒ௜ ൌ ݋௜ כ ሺሺߪ௜ כ 2ሻ െ 1ሻ 
where the neuron’s original output range (0 ≤ σi ≤ 1) is first 
translated to the range [-1, 1] and then mulitplied by an output 
gain parameter oi. This translation allows the same neuron to 
produce both forward rotation and backward rotation. Before 
calculating an agent’s change in position and orientation, the 
velocities were multiplied by the size of the integration time 
step. Numerical integration of each CTRNN was implemented 
using the fourth order Runge-Kutta method with an integration 
step of 0.1.  
C. Evolutionary algorithm 
A form of rank-based selection genetic algorithm was used 
as an optimization procedure of the agent’s behavior. The size 
of the population was fixed to 100 solutions evolving for up to 
around 1000 generations, although the process was generally 
interrupted beforehand because fit behaviors typically evolved 
after a few hundred generations. A solution was implemented 
as a real-valued vector of fixed dimension, which encoded all 
CTRNN parameters (i.e. weights, gains, and biases) of one 
agent. Agents were structurally identical. At the beginning of a 
search, the population of vectors was initialized to random 
values in the range [-1, 1]. Search was constrained such that the 
vector values are clipped to this range. Each component of the 
vector was linearly scaled to the appropriate interval of the 
CTRNN parameter. The connection strengths were chosen 
from the interval [-8, 8], biases from [-3, 3], input gains from [-
10, 10], output gains from [-2, 2], and time decay constants 
from [1, 50].  
Selection pressure was set so that the best solution produces 
1.3 offspring on average per generation. No elitism was used; 
all solutions are replaced after each generation. New offspring 
are created by applying a mutation operator to the parents. The 
mutation operator is Gaussian in nature, perturbing the parent 
solution with a mutation vector (i.e. a vector of real numbers 
specifying the changes for each component of a parent vector). 
The mutation vector’s direction is uniformly distributed on the 
unit hypersphere and its size is normally distributed with a 
mean of 0 and variance of 0.2. No crossover operator was used. 
A solution was evaluated for 10 trials, each with different 
starting positions and orientations (see below). The total fitness 
of a solution was calculated as an inverse weighted sum of the 
10 scores. By assigning more weight to less optimal scores, the 
evolutionary process is forced to generalize more; otherwise it 
is likely to focus on optimizing only a subset of easy conditions 
at the expense of more difficult conditions. At the beginning of 
each trial the orientations of the agents were randomly selected 
from a uniform distribution with range [0, 2π]. The initial (x, y) 
position of one agent was randomly selected from a uniform 
distribution with ranges ([-20, -5], [-20, 20]), and the other’s 
from ranges ([5, 20], [-20, 20]). This randomization of initial 
conditions ensured that the evolving behavioral strategy could 
not simply rely on consistent starting parameters, but had to be 
interactive and flexible. The initial ranges of the two agent’s 
positions were chosen so as to avoid bodily overlap. The neural 
activations of each agent were initialized to 0. 
Each trial lasted for 300 units of time, and a solution was 
rewarded in relation to how well the agents managed to spend 
their time close to each other. At each time step the difference 
between the initial distance from one agent’s center of body to 
the other’s center and their current distance was cummulatively 
added. This relative measure of distance was used to avoid 
biasing the fitness score according to the initial starting 
distance. The trial’s final fitness score was made dependent on 
the distance at each time step during the trial, rather than only 
the final distance, so that the agents are forced to head toward 
each other as quickly and consistently as possible. This simple 
evaluation function was chosen to evolve the agents to engage 
in an interaction process like Walter’s [31] robotic tortoises.  
The agents were readily evolved to locate each other from 
any starting configuration by relying on the signals provided by 
their sound sensors. After a reliable strategy was found, the 3rd 
interneuron was pruned from the CTRNN by setting all of its 
incoming and outgoing connection strengths to 0. The resulting 
2D system was then used as a seed for another population of 
solutions and further optimized by artificial evolution for a few 
dozen generations until the original strategy had been more or 
less reestablished. Because we wanted to better understand the 
minimal neural basis of this behavior, we decided to also prune 
the 2nd neuron in the same manner. That neuron’s output to the  
2nd motor was thereby fixed to a constant σ(θ), i.e. the logistic 
activation function applied to the neuron’s bias term. The new 
1D system was again further optimized by using it as a seed to 
create another population so as to continue evolution for a few 
dozen generations until fitness was sufficiently regained. To 
our surprise we could find suitable solutions even though the 
agents were reduced to one artificial neuron each. 
IV. RESULTS 
These embodied agents, each with only a 1D artificial nervous 
system (ANS), were the simplest possible nonreactive agents 
for this task2. As should be expected, since even reactive agents 
can succeed in a variety of homing tasks [54], they are still 
capable of finding each other. The 1D agents accomplish this 
task by spiraling in the direction of the strongest signal, and 
then colliding together (see Fig. 1 for an illustrative example). 
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the trajectories taken by two acoustically coupled agents 
as they move in a spiral pattern and approach each other. The CTRNN of each 
agent consists of only 1 neuron (in isolation it is a 1D continuous system). 
We then analyzed the properties of the time series of neural 
activity of ‘agent 1’ that was recorded during the trial shown in 
Fig. 1. What was immediately evident from visually examining 
the spiraling trajectories of the agents’ interaction process was 
that their changes in neural activation were converging on a 
relatively regular oscillatory pattern. We confirmed this pattern 
by plotting the agents’ neural activity (see Fig. 2).  
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of agents’ change of neuronal activation (y-axis) over time 
(x-axis). Although the agents’ CTRNNs are 1D in isolation, nonlinear coupling 
with each other via their embodiment enables a complex pattern of activity: an 
oscillation that never fully converges to a fixed limit cycle.  
This oscillatory pattern is already an interesting result for 
our purposes because limit cycles are not possible for a 1D 
continuous system that is not nonlinearly coupled to another 
system [37]. In principle, isolated 1D continuous systems will 
always converge on a fixed-point attractor. More importantly, 
in the case of our model it cannot be argued that the oscillatory 
signal is externally provided for the agents, because neither one 
                                                           
2 Strictly speaking, this is not entirely accurate. Even the behavior of an agent 
with a 0D ANS, i.e. with a reactive controller, is not reactive – as long as the 
agent is embodied [53]. We will return to the role of embodiment later. 
of the two agents is capable of producing such a signal alone, 
nor is it given by the external environment. The oscillation is 
an emergent product of the interaction between the two agents 
and their environment. The observation that the oscillation did 
not seem to be repeating precisely suggested that we may have 
found chaotic neural activity. However, in order to confirm this 
intuition we needed a more formal analysis of the pattern. 
Following standard practice for determining the underlying 
systemic properties of a nonlinear time series  [55], we had to 
calculate the CTRNN’s effective dimensionality as well as its 
largest Lyapunov exponent. The latter is used for evaluating 
whether a time series is chaotic, with positive exponent values 
being a clear sign of chaos. In comparison, Beer ([37], p. 495) 
observed the smallest isolated CTRNN with chaotic dynamics 
to be a 3D system. The largest Lyapunov exponent was 0.010 
and the effective Lyapunov dimension was 2.021, meaning that 
it was mildly chaotic. In terms of coupled nonlinear systems, 
Beer ([37], p. 502) found that driving a 2D system with an 
external periodic signal can produce chaotic dynamics. In his 
example the largest Lyapunov exponent was 0.023 and the 
Lyapunov dimension was 1.157.  
The CTRNN in our model differs from Beer’s examples in 
that it is even smaller (1D instead of 2D), and no independent 
input signal is provided. In order to obtain a better view of the 
long-term properties of the system, we ran the model for 3000 
units of time instead of the 300 units used during the 
evolutionary optimization. Using a measure of the false nearest 
neighbor to calculate the effective embedding dimension of 
one agent’s internal neural activity, we found the underlying 
system to be 3D. According to the Poincaré-Bendixon theorem 
(see [56], p. 210), a continuous system has to be at least 3D in 
order for chaotic activity to be possible.  
No random number generator was used during the run of a 
simulation, but it is always good to check for any unintended 
stochastic variation in the model. Using the determinism test 
introduced by Kaplan and Glass [57] we found the time series 
of activation to be highly deterministic (determinism factor k = 
0.93); an absolutely deterministic time series would have been 
k = 1. The slight difference is probably due to the model’s 
discrete step-by-step approximation of a continous system). 
Following Strogatz’s ([56], p. 323) tripartite definition of chaos 
as “aperiodic long-term activity in a deterministic system that 
exhibits sensitive dependence on initial conditions”, the only 
thing left to do is to determine the neural activity’s sensitivity 
to initial conditions. This can be done by calculating the neural 
time series’ largest Lyapunov exponent, which needs to be 
positive. And indeed the largest Lyapunov exponent was found 
to be 0.091, which indicates that the system’s dynamics are 
slightly more chaotic than Beer’s examples.  
These two analytic results are complements of each other, 
because smooth dynamical systems need to be at least 3D to 
exhibit chaotic dynamics. It also follows that the agent’s 
behavior, of which the neurons are a component, must be 
extended through the environment, since each isolated CTRNN 
is maximally a 1D system. By way of comparison, the largest 
Lyapunov exponent of the neural activity of an isolated 
CTRNN is -0.414, i.e. neither chaotic nor even very complex. 
The qualitative difference in dynamics of the isolated CTRNN 
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can also be intuitively seen by comparing Fig. 2 with Fig. 3. In 
the latter the neural activity quickly converges on a single 
fixed-point attractor and remains there for the rest of the trial. 
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of the time series of neural activation of the agent’s isolated 
CTRNN. The 1D system quickly converges to a fixed-point attractor. 
Thus, to our surprise, we managed to find a proof of 
concept of the validity of the EMH, based on the principles of 
the DSH, that was even more minimal than we had originally 
expected to be the case. Moreover, a closer investigation of the 
necessary elements of the chaotic neural activity gives support 
to a related hypothesis, namely that the mind is embodied. If 
we turn the agents into disembodied ghosts by removing the 
possibility of collisions, their complex pattern of activity can 
no longer be sustained and the dynamics converge on a fixed-
point (Fig. 4). In other words, the agents’ embodied orientation 
and position provide an additional source of dimensionality, 
which during nonlinear interactions can lead to chaos.  
 
Fig. 4. Illustration of agents’ change in neuronal activation (y-axis) over time 
(x-axis). The experimental conditions are the same as in Fig. 2, but without 
modeling the collisions between agents. Initially the two time series are the 
same as those of Fig. 2 until the time of the first bodily collision after about 175 
units of time. In the absence of collisions the agents continue to move closer to 
each other such that agent 1’s light sensor passes over the light-emitting center 
of the other agent (large neural activation spike for agent 1), until they come to 
rest such that their bodily centers are precisely on top of each other (both neural 
activations converge on a fixed-point attractor).  
V. DISCUSSION 
Our model of agent-environment interaction was primarily 
intended to provide a word of caution against overestimating 
the actual force of the coupling-constitution fallacy, which has 
been the focus of much debate regarding the EMH. We have 
shown how the agent’s behavior in the environment emerges as 
a result of the combined contributions of the various aspects of 
the overall model, i.e. two brain-body-environment systems in 
interaction with each other. We chose to model and analyze a 
minimal case of social interaction as an illustrative example of 
the dynamically extended mind, but the same arguments apply 
to embodied agents situated in a complex environment more 
generally. From the perspective of the DSH, which proposes a 
distributed view of cognition as the default mode of cognition, 
there is no coupling-constitution fallacy because properties of 
the sensorimotor interaction process cannot be reduced to that 
of the isolated components. We tried to illustrate this important 
insight with a minimal agent-based model, which gave us the 
following proof of concept: 
1. A continuous-time recurrent neural network (CTRNN) is 
a type of continuous dynamical system. 
2. The isolated (and therefore non-extended) CTRNN, that 
was intended for nonlinear coupling in our model, is 1D only. 
3. The activity of an isolated continuous dynamical system 
can only be cyclical if its phase space is at least 2D, and its 
activity can only be chaotic if its phase space is at least 3D 
(Poincaré–Bendixson theorem). 
4. The non-isolated CTRNN realized in our model exhibits 
oscillatory dynamics (i.e. approach toward limit cycle) as well 
as chaotic dynamics (i.e. positive largest Lyapunov exponent). 
5. It logically follows from the above that the phase space 
of the agent’s CTRNN must be explained in terms of the whole 
brain-body-environment-body-brain system.  
But how does this relate to the EMH, which begins with the 
assumption that cognition first of all takes place in the brain? If 
all that we were able to show with our model is that the agent’s 
ANS is constitutive of the emergent properties of an extended 
interaction process, this would not necessarily entail that the 
activity of the ANS itself was also constituted by, rather than 
merely caused by, this interaction process. It is a good strategy 
for the EMH to highlight that ongoing interaction between a 
cognitive agent and environment results in a novel, mutually 
encompassing process with new properties of its own [15, 26]. 
This appeal to emergence is an important part of the response 
to the reductionist critics. But to demonstrate that some aspects 
of the interaction process can be constitutive of the internal 
activity of the agent, we need to go further. We had to show 
that the time series of neural activity had new properties, e.g. 
Lyapunov dimensionality and the largest Lyapunov exponent, 
that were impossible to obtain for that CTRNN in isolation. 
Moreover, we required that this form of extension was not only 
due to an independent cause, but was part of the activity of the 
CTRNN. We therefore continue our proof of concept: 
6. The non-isolated CTRNN’s output is determined by its 
input, albeit mediated by its internal activity, while this input is 
determined by its motor output, albeit mediated by bodily and 
environmental (including social) activity.  
7. It logically follows from the above that the non-isolated 
CTRNN’s additional neural complexity is partially constituted 
by its own sensorimotor and social coupling. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that this proof of concept 
is of limited value when considering human cognition in the 
real world. For one thing, it is based on an extremely minimal 
model. Furthermore, we did not systematically search the space 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 S
ta
te
 o
f n
eu
ra
l a
ct
iv
at
io
n 
(s
) 
Units of time 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 S
ta
te
 o
f n
eu
ra
l a
ct
iv
at
io
n 
(s
) 
Unit of time 
Agent 1 
Agent 2 
of solutions, and so we cannot know how representative this 
solution is. Certainly, we do not expect all nonlinearly coupled 
1D continuous dynamical systems to exhibit a similarly high 
dimensionality and chaos. And yet the general message of the 
model does have some empirical support. For example, when 
two people oscillate their limbs (fingers or legs) while in visual 
contact, they start to spontaneously synchronize their motions 
as the frequency of oscillations increases [9, 58]. In fact, such 
synchronization is a widespread phenomenon, including during 
vocalization [59]. Moreover, acoustic social interactions can 
evoke profound changes in a person’s brain and body: guitar 
duets are preceded and accompanied by inter-brain oscillatory 
couplings [60], and choir singing is related to inter-personal 
cardiac and respiratory phase synchronization [61]. 
Nevertheless, we do not expect that the model captures all 
that is essential about human social interaction in particular; for 
example, it applies equally well to single-cell interactions, bird 
duets, and robotic multi-agent systems [49]. But this generality 
of the model’s results is precisely what is at stake, and it is why 
we chose to analyze a minimal dynamical system where the 
underlying principles are not obscured by the complexity of the 
phenomenon. The complexity of a human brain makes it hard 
to know how it is interactively transformed and extended in 
practice, but at least there is no such difficulty in principle. The 
claim that the dynamical organization of a system is changed 
during a nonlinear interaction with other systems is formally 
based on dynamical systems theory, in particular on the basic 
distinction between so-called “autonomous” (isolated) and 
“non-automous” (coupled) systems3. Add to this mathematical 
insight the fact that sensory input and motor output form a 
closed sensorimotor loop, and the extended mind hypothesis 
takes on the form of a universal principle of life and mind.  
Nevertheless, there is something right about the traditional 
folk-psychological intuition that our mind is individuated in 
our body, at least that is how it seems to us from our first-
person perspective most of the time. This is a phenomenon that 
clearly deserves explanation. The introspective observation that 
we experience ourselves as having a relatively stable personal 
identity, an identity that is not always continually transformed 
and dissolved during our interactions in the world (unlike for 
some people with schizophrenia), is something that must still 
be accounted for from the perspective of the DSH. The real 
challenge facing the DSH, therefore, is not to explain how 
cognition sometimes becomes extended, but rather how our 
relatively stable sense of self is maintained even in the face of 
continous sensorimotor and social extension. Accordingly, the 
nervous system’s endogeneous activity deserves a closer look, 
in particular in terms of those processes that allow a temporary 
decoupling from ongoing interactions [63].  
VI. CONCLUSION 
As a variant of Cartesian dualism, the computational theory of 
mind has traditionally assumed that cognition is something that 
only takes place within the head. However, during the last two 
decades this internalist boundary has been questioned by 
embodied, enactive, and extended theories of mind. In response 
critics have argued that the extended mind hypothesis is based 
                                                           
3 This mathematical use of the term “autonomy” should not be confused with 
uses of the term found in biology and other disciplines [62]. 
on a coupling-constitution fallacy, i.e. that when a cognitive 
process in the head is coupled with a part of the environment, 
that part is neither necessarily nor typically constitutive of the 
cognitive process. However, this philosophical critique is not 
supported by nonlinear dynamical systems theory..  
We have used an evolutionary robotics approach to create a 
minimal model that illustrates some of the transforming effects 
of nonlinear agent-environment coupling both on an embodied 
agent’s external behavior and on its internal artificial nervous 
system. A dynamical systems approach thus has the potential 
to formally save the extended mind hypothesis from its critics. 
Nevertheless, this mathematical response comes at a price for 
mainstream cognitive science: it predicts interactive cognitive 
extension to be the primary and default condition of mind (in 
evolutionary, developmental, and behavioral terms), rather than 
an occasional exception to an otherwise internal mind. 
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